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What accounts for variations in the size o f OEC D  stock markets? Existing answers point to 
the negative impact o f state control over industry, enhanced by state centralization, and 
mitigated by common law. I counter that state centralization has a positive impact on stock 
market growth as well. It holds in check local governments’ resistance to the centripetal 
mobility o f capital, without which stock markets cannot develop. I provide empirical 
evidence of this dual effect by identifying variables for each effect and regressing them 
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SOCIAL AGAINST M O BILE CAPITAL:
Explaining Cross-National Variations in Stock Market Size in the OECD
D o political institutions affect stock markets and how? The current literature is 
almost unanimous in thinking that markets in general, and financial markets in particular, 
require limited government to develop. A strong, centralized state, it is argued, has a 
debilitating effect on capital market growth. Against the dominant antistatist view, I offer 
a more nuanced interpretation. State strength cuts both ways: on the one hand, state 
strength offers the government the means to establish an integrated financial market. An 
integrated financial market is a powerful redistributional tool, transferring capital across 
geographic and sectoral borders, too politically explosive for governments in weak states 
to sustain. On the other hand, state strength provides the government with the means to 
dabble in the allocation o f credit, a temptation that few governments manage to resist, 
even though it has the unwanted effect o f undermining market discipline and capping 
stock market growth in the long run. After a brief survey o f the literature, I introduce my 
argument, then develop to some length two paradigmatic cases, and test the argument on 
O EC D  countries. I expand on the broader implications for the market-state-law trinity in 
conclusion.
The Literature
The current literature is profoundly influenced by the belief that state and market 
form a volatile pair. Antistatism pervades the first three o f the four lines o f  argument on 
the origins o f stock markets: (1) social capital, (2) federalism, (3) common law as a 
bulwark against state control, and (4) common law as a boost to shareholders’ rights.
The literature on social capital emphasizes the role o f trust, sociability, norms of 
reciprocity, networks, and civic traditions— various concepts that boil down to the 



























































































individuals to cooperate outside the family and without the help o f the state to produce 
socially efficient outcomes. Exemplary o f this revival is Fukuyama’s work on trust.' 
Fukuyama (1995) argues that all low-trust societies (a category that includes France, 
Southern Italy, China) share a common industrial structure: Numerous private firms that 
tend to be small and family-controlled coexist with a few large-scale enterprises that need 
the support o f  the state to be viable. In contrast to this “saddle-shaped” distribution of 
firms, high-trust societies such as the UK, the United States, Japan, and Germany have 
many large and very large managerial concerns, perfeedy viable without state support. A 
deficiency in trust reflects the dominance o f a centralized and arbitrary state during an 
earlier phase o f historical development.1 2 Though Fukuyama does not draw any, 
consequences for stock markets seem straightforward. The most popular stocks among 
investors always are those o f  large-scale private companies. Family firms and state-owned 
firms are either not listed or, even if they are, do not attract investors’ attention as much 
as large private corporations, for they are controlled by a core o f interests— family 
members in the case o f the family firm, the state in that o f the state-owned firm— that do 
not count share value as their first priority. Trust and stock market development should 
thus be linked.
Levy (1999) applied a telescoped version o f the social-capital argument to 
economic policymaking in post-dirigiste France. The success o f dirigisme in the postwar 
decades, Levy argues, caused an underdevelopment o f social and local associations, 
which came back to haunt policymakers when they sought to disengage the state from 
the economy in the 1980s and have banks and private investors take over the financing
1 Fukuyama 1995. See also the seminal contributions o f Coleman 1990 and Putnam 1993. For an 
empirical test, see La Porta et al. (1997b).




























































































o f industry. In light o f the failure o f market forms of coordination to relay the state, the 
latter was forced to intervene anew, rescuing ailing firms.
The second line o f argument comes from new institutional economics. It makes 
market growth dependent on the co-existence (and not />n?-existence as in the social 
capital literature) o f limited government. North and Weingast (1989) argue that limited 
government made possible the expansion o f a market for the public debt. Whereas it was 
difficult for a monarch holding the crown by divine right to commit not to repudiate past 
engagements, parliamentary rule, by securing individual rights and including wealth 
holders in the policymaking process, offered the required guarantee and reduced 
investment risk. The public debt was then instrumental in the latter acceptance o f private 
securities, giving a boost to the private capital market.
More recently, Weingast (1995) specified the notion o f limited government as 
“market-preserving federalism,” a particular type of federalism encountered in 18,h- 
century England and 19,h-century United States, in which local governments enjoyed 
primary regulatory responsibility but could not use it to restrict the circulation o f goods 
and factors o f  production in the economy. Echoing Root’s (1994, p. 156) study o f the 
development o f competitive markets in England and France, Weingast stresses the role 
o f the common law system; unlike French courts, British courts were independent from 
the Crown and, moreover, they were local and in competition with each other. This 
made it difficult for possessors o f royal monopolies to appeal to judges to defend their 
rents beyond London. The jurisdictional competition between urban and rural courts was 
instrumental in blocking the expansion o f urban guilds to guild-free rural areas. By 
contrast, in France, the monarchy managed to bypass traditional local jurisdictions, 




























































































finances depended— throughout the realm.3 The higher degree o f centralization in 
Trance relative to England explains the lesser development o f competitive markets in 
France.4
The third argument, advanced by Rajan and Zingales (1999), zeroes in on the 
judicial component flagged by Weingast and Root. The two Chicago economists start 
from the premises that markets and centralized power are incompatible. Governments 
are not ordinarily interested in ensuring investors’ property rights against expropriation 
or, even if law-bound, they prefer to deal with banks than with markets. Governments 
are also responsive to anti-market coalitions— the landed gentry in the 19th century, the 
unemployed masses following the market crash o f the 1930s— which markets seem to 
regularly generate by destroying primitive forms o f  insurance and providing little 
substitute. Therefore, decentralization o f polidcal power, by which they mean the 
precedent-based, judge-administered system o f common law encountered in England 
and ex-colonies, safeguards property rights and promotes financial innovation.5 Common 
law owes this advantage to its peculiar dynamic, blocking top-down changes ordered by 
the political center, but open to grass-roots contractual innovation suggested by 
individual practitioners. For instance, the common law due process is better at legalizing 
complex ownership structures, as well as notions o f trust and good faith, which are 
typical o f the arm’s length contracts between firms and investors in financial markets (p. 
29).6 Civil law in contrast cannot evolve on its own but requires an act o f the legislator, 
making it “an easy prey to political movements advocating a command and control
3 Weingast 1995, p. 7 ; Root 1994, pp. 150, 157.
4 Focusing on the 17,h and 18lh centuries, Weingast and Root have little to say about the actual 
development o f corporate securities markets, which occurred in the 19lh century.
5 In the common law system, the judge de facto makes the law, whereas in the civil law system, it is the 
legislator.
6 In an earlier formulation o f the hypothesis, Marcello De Cecco also linked financial innovation to 




























































































system” (11). In sum, Rajan and Zingales offer a plausible argument for the legal origins 
o f stock market performance. Common law is a bulwark against state control and state 
control is bad for markets.
The fourth and last line o f argument also uses legal origins. La Porta ct al. (1997a, 
1998) argue— and show— that common law countries have more developed stock 
markets than civil law countries. The causal mechanism they point to, however, is not the 
degree to which law shields markets from state encroachment, but that common law 
protects shareholders better than civil law. Law enforcement is also lowest in French civil 
law countries.
Except for the last argument, the literature on market development is 
unanimously antistatist. Manifestations o f state strength, either in the form o f a prior 
strong or dirigist central government (Fukuyama and Levy), the co-existence o f a 
centralized state (North, Weingast, Root), or state-made law (Rajand and Zingales), 
hinder market development in general, and financial market in particular. In contrast, 
checks and balances, federalism, and common law arc alternatively associated with 
corporate and financial development. The survey of the literature provides us with two 
distinct hypotheses about the relative growth o f  stock markets: an antistatist hypothesis, 
according to which market growth is negatively related with state control; and a pure 
legal hypothesis, according to which large markets are associated with common law. 
Although legal origins is invoked in both lines o f argument, the hypothesized path 
between legal origins and stock market size is indirect (mediated by the state control 
variable) in the antistatist argument, whereas direct in the pure legal argument.
Accurate in part, the antistatist hypothesis is incomplete. Political 
decentralization, I claim, also has a negative impact on financial market development, 
suppressing its otherwise positive effect. My argument holds in two points: (1) First, 




























































































because financial peripheries are politically weaker in centralized than in decentralized 
regimes, stock market size is associated with state centralization. (2) Second, stock 
markets cannot list publicly-owned enterprises and do not like to list privately-owned, yet 
state-regulated enterprises. State control is typically larger in centralized than in 
decentralized states. Putting one and two together, state centralization both positively 
and negatively affects the stock market— the net effect is null (see Figure 1). I develop 
the positive and negative effects in the next two sections successively.
[Figure 1]
The Geography o f Finance
Financial intermediaries are specialized along the center-periphery continuum. 
The logic behind the spatial arrangement rests on a political compromise, which is 
spurred by two simultaneous market failures: economies o f agglomeration and 
information asymmetry. Consider economies o f agglomeration, first. According to the 
recent literature on economic geography, economies o f agglomeration result from the 
combination o f internal scale economies and forward-backward linkages.7 Financial 
centers display both features.
Like an old-fashioned market place, the financial market is characterized by 
internal scale economies— the higher the volume, the more efficient the pricing, the 
more attractive to buyers and sellers the market is. Internal scale economies exist both in 
the long- and short-term segments o f  the market. The long-term segment, commonly 
referred to as “primary capital market,” primary because bonds and stocks are traded for 
the first time, pools the largest issuers in the economy. The issuing o f  a security presents 
steep fixed costs, favoring large over small issues. The short-term market, the so-called 
“money market,” on which currencies, commercial paper, notes, and certificate of




























































































deposits are traded, also thrives on volume. The money market is reserved to banks, 
institutional investors, and large firms.
The relation between the capital market and the money market is mediated by 
two institutions: the “secondary capital market” and the money center banks. For the 
sake o f greater clarity, consider Figure 2, showing the four components, linked together 
in a circuitous way. The arrows indicate the flow o f funds. Start from arrow 1. Banks 
depend on the capital market to transform long-term loans to industry into securities, 
recoup their liquidity, and lend anew. Then move to arrow 2. The money market depends 
on banks for the supply o f cash. Until recently, cash essentially took the form o f savings 
deposits. Banks lent to brokers and market players, who pledged securities as collateral. 
With money-market and mutual funds displacing savings deposits in recent years, banks 
are rushing into brokerage and asset management to serve as liaison between investors 
and market.
On to arrow 3. The secondary capital market is the place where stocks bought in 
the primary market can be resold. The breadth o f the secondary market is determined in 
part by the depth o f the money market. A deep money market lets brokers, security 
dealers, and arbitrageurs o f  all stripes borrow the cash they need to finance the short­
term positions they repeatedly take, either to make markets for securities or merely 
speculate. Arrow 4 last. The depth o f the secondary market is important to attract 
investors— they value the liquidity that it offers. As a result, they are willing to pay a 
premium for liquidity, making listing for issuers desirable, since higher equity value 
automatically translates into a higher capacity to raise debt— both direct and 
intermediate.8
[Figure 2)
8 It is impossible to separate linkages into forward and backward, for there is no linear ordering of 




























































































Added to the internal scale economies that characterize the markets, the above 
circularity generates economies o f agglomeration. It explains why the financial center is 
the place where all the largest and most profitable banks in the economy are 
headquartered. It explains why financial centers develop at the expense o f their 
peripheries.9
The point to appreciate is that there is no separation between long and short: 
Capital markets are leveraged by demand deposits and money market accounts. There is 
no separation between debt and equity either: Corporate bank loans are lifted up by 
higher equity value. They all expand together or contract together. Explaining the size of 
the primary stock market is not that different from explaining the size o f the secondary 
capital market, that o f the money market, that o f the center banking sector, and vice 
versa— it all boils down, in part at least, to identifying what constrains the expansion o f 
any component.
Surely, there are limits to financial centralization. First, concentration is unlikely 
to go on until the periphery totally empties out; it probably reaches an upper bound in 
the form o f rising opportunity costs."1 Second, and more importandy, information 
asymmetry has opposite, centrifugal effects. Financial markets fail if  investment 
information is costly and imperfect, as it usually is in small-business lending.11 Litde 
public information is usually available on small firms, making their securities or 
commercial paper non-tradable on financial markets. Small firms, instead, fund their
9 There are additional incentives for concentration in financial centers. Geographic concentration 
supports a well-supplied labor market and specialized local providers of inputs— lawyers, accountants, 
messenger services, public relations firms, and computing services. It also facilitates the spread of more 
reliable information, usually through personal contact. The pricing o f untested products (as in primary 
issuing) is sensitive to private information.
10 Financial centers become congested, office space gets expensive, and the wages paid rise out o f line 
with the rest o f the country. Screen trading and the linking o f markets have made it possible for banks 
to relocate activities pertaining to trading on secondary markets in second-tier cities. However, primary 
issuing and most investment-banking type services, which require a large input of specialized providers 




























































































long-term needs with local bankers. The comparative advantage o f local banks lies in 
their access to local investment information, which they scrape together through 
membership in local social networks— the chamber o f commerce, the municipal 
authority, and other relevant local organizations. Unlike the financial center, the financial 
periphery is not market oriented but bank based. Local security markets most often do 
not exist, or if they do, they are “specialist” markets, listing the stocks o f local industries, 
for which trading is slow, dominated by insiders’ knowledge, and unsuitable for a larger 
stock exchange. In either case, good investment information is essential, for local bankers 
usually do not have the possibility to exit from a long-term lending position the way 
center bankers do— by unloading the loan onto the market. Local banks also tend to lend 
to smaller firms than center banks and, for that reason, they are usually smaller. Large 
size affords visibility, favors good information, eases access to markets, and induces 
migration to the center.1 2
However, information asymmetry has a centrifugal effect only on the assets side 
o f the bank’s balance sheet, not on the liability side. Information asymmetry prevents 
local borrowers from tapping the financial center for money, but it docs not prevent 
local savers from sending their liquidity to the center. Local banks and money markets 
compete for the same savings. In the past, local banks and the local branches o f center 
banks competed for individual deposits. Local banks re invested them in loans to local 
industry, whereas center banks drained most o f them to the money market (at least until 
the 1930s). Center banks enjoyed a competitive advantage over local banks, for they were 
able to offer investors a wider range o f products and higher returns. This competitive
11 See Hòlmstrom and Tirole 1997.
12 The point is not that local, small enterprises are unable to get loans from center-located banks, but 
that the local agents o f center banks are not as free as local bankers to meet the financial needs of local 
firms, best characterized as “relationship banking” (Petersen and Rajan 1995). Center banks’ local 




























































































advantage is even more pronounced today with the generalization o f money-market 
accounts, by which banks pass on to depositors the money-market rate in exchange for a 
fee. No longer able to keep savings on their books, all banks now have to finance their 
investments on the money market, at a price that varies with their credit ratings. 
Dependence on credit ratings is causing problems with local banks, for it means that 
banks must refrain from lending to clients with little or no public visibility— the local 
banks’ traditional and most logical line o f business— lest credit-rating agencies and 
specialized newsmedia overweigh the risk presented by these loans, forcing the bank to 
increase capital in the face o f a downgrade and higher borrowing costs. Local banks are 
at a comparative disadvantage when it comes to financing their investments.
Local banks cannot survive without regulatory help. Help may come in the form 
o f legal interdiction to enter local markets, tax subsidies, or a state guarantee. Legal 
prohibitions existed in the United States until 1994, when an Act o f Congress legalized 
interstate banking. They still exist in many European countries, where hostile takeovers 
are ruled out by unwritten codes o f conduct. In such conditions, no large bank can enter 
a local market without securing the consent o f the relevant local government.13 A second 
way for government to help local banks is to maintain their non-profit status. In 
Germany, Austria, Scandinavia, Italy, Spain, and Japan, the local banks are non-profit 
banks— savings banks and credit cooperatives— , paying limited or no taxes and enjoying 
a state guarantee on liabilities. In the presence o f a guarantee, the bank gets the credit 
rating o f the guarantor, which is top when it is the state. The state guarantee enables local
agents have to meet lending standards and liquidity requirements that keep changing with the overall 
position o f the bank.





























































































banks to refinance more cheaply on the Euromarkets than the private banks despite 
making riskier loans.14
The need for regulatory help is not specific to local banks, but is also felt by local 
firms and local governments. I f  the local banks either concede the local deposits to the 
center banks or try to shore up their credit ratings by purging their balance sheets o f low­
rated loans, they cannot finance the local entrepreneurs, who, due to information 
asymmetry, have nowhere else to go. By extension, local governments are unable to 
maintain a strong tax base if local banks and local producers have no reliable access to 
capital. There is indeed a triangular interdependence between affluent local industries, 
well-entrenched local banks, and politically powerful local governments. Local industries 
need local banks to sustain local investment, local banks need the political protection o f 
local governments to hold back the competition for resources from the center banks, and 
local governments need prosperous local banks and industries to maintain their relative 
fiscal independence from, and power vis-à-vis, the central government.
A caveat is in order. Not all peripheral districts would necessarily suffer from the 
centralization and globalization o f  capital markets. Those districts that accommodate the 
rise o f firms large enough to efficiently tap equity markets, arc not necessarily harmed by 
the decline o f local banking. One would expect these districts and the firms to which 
they are home to espouse the cause o f centralization or, at least, be conflicted— indeed, 
although the large firm provides local employment, its interest in the welfare o f its local 
host is circumstantial and reversible.
14 In a study o f German Landesbanks, Sinn (1999, p. 34) reports actual credit ratings and hypothetical 
ratings that would be given to these banks on the strength of their balance sheet structure if they had no 
government protection. The resulting downgrading is equivalent to the step from Triple A to Double A, 
or from Double A to a simple A, allowing banks to get five-year money on the Eurobonds market for 




























































































However widely it may be felt, the need for regulatory help is insufficient in and 
o f itself to translate into actual regulatory help. The potential losers must get together 
and overwhelm the political power o f the financial center. Too few to make a difference 
electorally, yet much too scattered to act collectively, especially against a geographically 
concentrated opponent, local banks and firms solely have the local government 
connection as viable political channel, and only so in countries where local governments 
enjoy a modicum amount o f political power— in decentralized countries. Local 
governments in federal and otherwise decentralized states can use their collective veto in 
the upper chamber to block financial deregulation. In contrast, they are powerless in 
centralized states. As a result, politicians as a whole are more likely to arbitrate the center- 
periphery conflict in favor o f the periphery in decentralized states, or at least do so more 
often, than in centralized states.
The above discussion yields the first causal proposition: The capacity o f the financial 
center to attract resources is a Junction o f the si^e o f the money center banking sector\ which, in turn, is a 
Junction o f the degree o f centralisation o f the state.
I have argued so far that territorial decentralization is a hindrance to financial 
development. I now elaborate on the more common claim that state control is also a 
hindrance.
State Control o f Industry
Stock exchanges need stocks to trade. The wider the range o f stocks they can 
offer, the more possibiliucs for diversificadon they make available to potential investors. 
Moreover, each stock must occur in a sufficiently large quantity, guaranteeing a constant 
trading volume. Last, in order to insure liquidity, the stock must be visible, able to focus 




























































































a player trades a stock only if  she thinks that others will trade that same stock.15 *The 
existence o f a focal point helps solve coordination problems to every participants’ 
benefit. Famous stocks, such as Microsoft, Dell Computer, Cisco, and G E  Financial have 
the wherewithal’s to attract transactions. Their price includes a liquidity premium. They 
are the workhorses o f the exchange in which they are listed, providing brokers with their 
daily bread. Five percent o f  the stocks listed on the N Y SE represented 51 percent of 
trading value in 1998, 60 percent in London, and 86 percent in Frankfurt.,fi Stocks that 
are unknown and with litde prospect of getting known are unlikely to be listed. The 
companies that tend to get listed are either very large, in growth sectors, or both.
In many European countries many of the companies that would Fit that profile 
are owned by the state. Until twenty years ago, 9 out o f 10 o f the largest companies in 
European countries were in that situation. Sectors such as railways, telecommunications, 
postal service, coals, gas, petroleum, electricity, air transport, shipbuilding, and banking, 
were in many cases part o f  the public sector.17 State ownership denied stock markets an 
adequate capital base.
There was no hard and crisp logic behind the creation o f public sectors. The 
theory o f  natural monopoly justified state regulation, not state ownership. The poor’s 
desire to make the rich pay could be more easily reached through taxation than through 
nationalization. The 1980s French Socialist claim that state ownership (of banks 
especially) provided governments with the means of their industrial policy was mocked
15 The problem is aptly defined by Raghuram Rajan and Luigi Zingales as “a chicken and egg 
problem...people will not trade in a particular market unless they think the market is liquid, but the 
market will not be liquid unless they trade” (1999, p. 17).
,6 FIBV  1998, p. 88.
17 The steel sector in Austria, Belgium, Britain, France, and Italy was state-owned. In the automobile 
industry, Renault, VW , SEA T, Alfa Romeo, Jaguar, British Leyland, Rover, Rolls-Royce ended up 




























































































by specialists o f  French politics.18 The truth is that most nationalizations in most 
countries were unplanned, but occurred because the government sought to salvage an 
unprofitable private firm from bankruptcy. The firm may have been involved in a sector 
deemed strategic for security reasons or it was a large firm, employing a large and 
politically sensitive workforce— or both, as with railways.19 Once public, many o f these 
firms stayed public, not out o f post-facto rationalization, but because the state could not 
dispose o f their assets— capital markets were too narrow. The upshot was a sub- 
optimal— catch-22-like— equilibrium, in which the large size o f the public sector 
prevented the stock market from reaching the critical mass that would have allowed it to 
bear the privatization o f state-owned firms. This equilibrium was also characterized by an 
underdeveloped internal money market and a non-financial sector financing investments 
through bank loans and retained profits.2"
There are difficulties in establishing comparative data on the size o f state-owned 
industrial sectors. The impossibility to reach an easy definition o f what constitutes a 
public enterprise makes aggregate data— such as employment and gross capital 
formation— uninformative.21 Aggregate data also fail to reveal key differences in state 
control. Although nationalized industries in Britain and France were truly national, most 
o f the 4000 public enterprises in West Germany at the time were— and still are— at Land 
and local level.22 In Sweden, localities run some o f the public utilities. Moreover, 
although nationalized firms in France included the biggest manufacturing firms, in
18 See Cohen et al. 1984.
19IRI, the Italian state holding company, was initially created in the 1930s to take over the industrial 
holdings o f the three virtually-bankrupted main Italian banks; see Posner and W oolf 1967. IRI ended 
up producing, among various things, Christmas panettone and 25 percent o f Italian gelato.
20 See Loriaux 1991 on France.
21 For employment and capital formation data on a dozen OECD countries, see Pathirane and Blades 
1982, 268, 273.





























































































contrast, comparable British and German firms were privately owned. Last, the numbers 
hide very different forms o f state involvement in the management o f these companies, 
which ranged from close in France and Belgium, to arms’ length in Germany and the 
Netherlands.23 While these variations made little difference for stock markets at the time, 
they became relevant in the 1980s and 1990s, when governments began to divest.
State control matters to stock market growth because it tends to outlive 
privatization. The incorporation o f a public company is a necessary but not sufficient 
condition to stock market growth. The state also has to abandon control, both direct in 
the form o f majoritarian— and sometimes even minoritarian— participation, and indirect, 
through the appointment o f a core-controlling group (the French noyau dur) o f companies 
linked together through mutual cross-shareholdings. Although cross-shareholdings 
artificially boost the capitalization o f the stock market— the same shares arc counted 
twice— they also curb trading by the core shareholders, who cannot sell for a determinate 
period. Investors are also unlikely to find the stock attractive, as the management team of 
the company is shielded from external takeover bids. Unlikely to fail, a state-controlled 
firms is equally unlikely to maximize shareholder value. In the end, state control is a 
cause for thin trading.
A cause o f  state control is centralization. Centralization provides the central 
government with the capacity to increase its power over the economy. Since a major 
industrial rescue threatens local governments with a roundabout way o f tilting the 
constitutional balance between the federal state and its constituent parts, state control is 
an unlikely occurrence in decentralized countries, where local governments possess 
extensive powers o f veto.24
23 See Parris et al.1987, ch. 7.
24 Note that a similar logic has been used to account for the dearth of privatization programs in 




























































































I can now introduce the second causal proposition: The capacity o f exchanges to list 
attractive stocks is a negative function o f state control, in turn a positive function o f state centralisation. 
This proposition is only valid in the present period, as it would have made no sense prior 
to World War I, when state ownership o f industry was not accepted practice.
The two causal propositions together point to a mixed, and thus indeterminate, 
effect o f the variable state centralization. In the first proposition, state centralization 
positively effects stock markets, for it denies local governments the capacity to divert 
finance to small-firm lending. In the second proposidon, state centralizadon negatively 
affects stock markets, for it enables politicians to maintain some form o f state control 
over large industrial concerns.
Two Paradigms
A somewhat detailed presentation o f  the French and German cases will help 
flesh out the argument. These two cases were chosen for their closeness o f fit with the 
argument. France has a centralized state, and thus a weak local banking sector. The 
deregulation o f  the stock market in the 1980s was relatively easy, but a lingering high 
level o f state control hampered privatization and stock market capitalization. In contrast 
to France, Germany has a decentralized state and limited federal state intervention in 
industry. The large size o f  the local banking sector, however, deferred and muffled the 
German “Big Bang”.
France has a centralized regime. The weakness o f local governments is 
responsible for the centralization and concentration o f the banking system (see Table 1). 
The savings banks, initially local town creations, were rescued by the Treasury in 1830. 
The cooperative movement was anemic and re-organized by the state in the wake of
privatization threatens to rob local governments from an important power base, if not a source of 
revenues. Although this argument does suggest that decentralized countries are less likely to evince 
large privatization programs, which is true, it fails to take into account the fact that decentralized 




























































































World War I. The last local private banks disappeared in the financial crisis of the 1930s. 
The chronic weakness o f French local banking justified the multiplication o f special 
credit agencies to provide subsidized credit to farmers and small business. French center 
banks never had difficulties draining peripheral deposits to Paris, which was home to a 
lively stock market prior to the 1930s. Once the decision was made in the 1980s to 
dismande the postwar system o f  allocation o f credit and to broaden the Parisian equity 
market, the state encountered no local opposition. The measure was imposed by the 
state, at times without even consultation with banks.25
France centralized rule-making is also responsible for significant state control of 
industry. Until a recent date, the state-owned sector included the biggest manufacturing 
firms— Renault, Thomson, Rhone-Poulenc, Pechiney-Uginc Kuhlmann, Roussclf Uclaf, 
Saint-Gobain-Pont a Mousson, Sacilor, Usinor, Bull, Matra, and Dassault. Although 
these firms were obvious candidates for privatization, French governments proceeded 
with caution. Rather than relying on the open bid system, the government invited banks, 
insurance companies, and large firms to create core-controlling interests, linked to each 
other by means o f cross-shareholdings and interlocking directorates. The cross­
shareholdings limited the market appeal o f the newly privatized stocks. No one could 
attempt a hostile takeover, reducing current management’s incentive to improve 
profitability. Further, too close a relationship with government— the Gaullist government 
used privatization as a way o f rewarding loyalists— increased the risk o f corruption and 
managerial involvement in a public scandal, with dismal consequences for share value. In 
the end, the noyaux durs did not survive the economic slowdown o f the early 1990s, as 
many o f the core shareholders were hard-pressed to sell redundant assets to plug losses 
or simply refocus their holdings around their core activities. The state had to rescue





























































































several just-privatized firms— 3 banks (CEPM E, CFF, Société Marseillaise de Crédit), an 
insurer (GAN), several manufacturers (Renault, PSA, Michelin, Bull, Thomson), and Air
r '  26F ran ce .
Two large banks in France— Crédit Agricole and Crédit Lyonnais— are still not 
listed on the Bourse. Although poor performance accounts for delaying privatization in 
the case of the latter, protectionism alone is accountable for the former— with its mutual 
status, Crédit Agricole, the second largest bank in Europe, can buy any firm, yet is 
immune from hostile takeovers. It is no wonder that the capitalization o f the Bourse is 
still unimpressive by historical standards.
[Table 1)
Germany, unlike France, is a decentralized country, with a decentralized banking 
system. The local banking sector in Germany represent 65 percent o f  total bank assets in 
1995 f i  able 1). This sector is essentially composed o f credit cooperatives, savings banks, 
and the Lander-owned Landesbanks— initially giro institutions o f the savings banks that 
have become regular commercial banks. The much-vaunted GroPbanken represent only 
26 percent o f  assets. For more than a century, local governments have protected local 
banks by means o f  state guarantees on deposits, tax breaks, and subsidies, and the hard- 
won right by savings banks to offer their clientele the same products as commercial 
banks. Until the deregulation of the money market in the 1980s, the two systems did not 
communicate with each other except at the very top. Savings banks in districts with 
excess deposits over loans would transfer their net surplus to savings banks in districts 
with excess loans over deposits; only the net surplus was lent to the commercial banking 
sector. The capacity o f the GroPbanken to drain savings to the financial center was 
considerably less developed than in France. 26




























































































Historically, the German stock market was underdeveloped. Until 1990, Germany 
had eight regional stock exchanges. Their deregulation, which allowed Franfurt to break 
loose from the obligations toward the other seven regional exchanges, led to an intricate 
debate, not so much between brokers and the rest o f  the financial profession as in 
France, as between the center and the periphery. The “Frankfurt Coalition”, including no 
less than the Federal Finance Minister Waigel along with the four largest banks and 
Hessen (Frankfurt’s Lander), pushed to have stock markets play a larger part in corporate 
financing. They were opposed by the seven smaller exchanges and their supervisors— the 
respective Lander governments.27 The local coalition opposed computerized trading, the 
opening o f a futures market, and the creation o f a central supervisory agency. They 
feared the centralizing impact o f  these measures and the eventual impoverishment of 
their local economies. Eventually, in 1992, the Frankfurt coalition overcame the status 
quo, but at the price o f  a compromise recognizing the claims o f the peripheral coalition. 
Part o f the deal was the creation o f the Neuer Markt— a parallel, less strictly regulated, 
market for smaller stock issues— Landesbanks’ turf.
Although German federalism hindered the centripetal flow o f funds, it helped 
stock market development by keeping state control o f industry— the French disease— to 
a minimum. The federal public sector was relatively insignificant, including coal, utilities, 
and services, but excluding the sectors o f industry which were crucial in the drive for 
exports. In contrast to France, the household names in manufacturing— V EBA , Siemens, 
Volkswagen, Daimler-Benz, Bayer, Hoechst, BASF, Thyssen, Bosch, Krupp, and 
BMW— were privately-owned. The local government public sector, albeit large, included




























































































no large firms, except for the above-mentioned landesbanks. Moreover, privatization is 
not strongly championed by business or the main political parties, but is hesitant.28
Germans, like French, are not strong on market competition, to which they 
prefer the toned-down version o f “social market.” Yet, unlike France, the absence of 
self-standing market institutions in Germany is no cause for state control, due mosdy to 
the decentralized nature o f  the regime. Like the United States, another decentralized 
country, Germany is characterized by the strength o f its local and social associations, 
which offset the power o f the state.
EvidenceJrom 20 O EC D  Countries
My purpose so far has been to illustrate the partial argument that I offered earlier. 
I now try to assess its generalizability to the other O EC D  countries. I embed it in a 
broader system, including alternative hypotheses and plausible control variables.
Consider the flow chart drawn in Figure 3. At the core is the diamond-shape argument of 
Figure 1— a system o f variables with effects working in opposite directions suppressing 
each other.29 A correlate o f  the model is the absence o f any direct relationship between 
state centralization and stock market (represented by a 0 coefficient).
[Figure 3]
To this, I added the various versions o f  the antistatist and common law 
arguments that I surveyed earlier: (1) Levy’s argument that state control (dirigisme) harms 
stock market (negative arrow running from state control to stock market); (2) Weingast’s 
and Root’s argument that centralization indirectly arms market growth (represented by a 
positive arrow running from state centralization to state control [absolutism] and a 
negative one running from state control to stock market). The first two arguments are
n  With the exception o f East German industry; see Esser 1998.
29 This type o f system is referred to in the literature as a “suppressor” or “inconsistent” system; see 




























































































nested in the diamond-shape model. The last two are separate: (3) Rajan and Zingales’s 
argument that common law indirectly bolsters stock markets through the mediation o f 
state control (two negative arrows, the first running from common law to state control, 
the second, from state control to stock market); (4) La Porta et al.’s argument that 
common law directly strengthens stock market (a positive arrow directly connecting 
common law and stock market).
Given the supplied-side bias o f all these variables, I included three variables to 
control for the demand side: greater wealth (GNP per capita) and a larger old-age 
population dependent on pension investment funds should raise the demand for stocks. 
In contrast, the presence of a well-developed, pay-as-you-go, state-mandated pension 
system should reduce the demand for pension funds.
I now describe the variables. The dependent variable is the market value (i.e., 
capitalization) o f  the exchanges weighted by GDP. Calculated by the International 
Federation o f Stock Exchanges, the measure offers the advantage to aggregate various 
national stock exchanges, to include only shares of domestic companies, and to exclude 
investment funds and companies whose only business goal is to hold shares o f  other 
listed companies. The measure has the drawback to double count cross-shareholdings, 
which are known to be higher in Japan, Germany, and France than in Britain or the 
United States. Note, however, that cross-shareholdings have an offsetting dampening 
impact on market activity, thereby making the net impact on capitalization 
indeterminate.341
State centralization is measured by the proportion o f government revenues 
drained by the central government. The exact measure is a fraction having for numerator 30
30 An alternative measure of stock market size would be to use turnover. This measure raises problems 
of comparability, as stock exchanges treat off-market transactions differently to compile turnover 




























































































the sum o f central government receipts and for denominator the sum o f all government 
receipts. The limit o f  this measure must be stressed. The allocation o f revenues may not 
be a good reflection o f  the distribution o f authority between central and local 
governments. The OLiCD recendy released systematic informadon on various degrees o f 
local tax autonomy for 19 countries, 14 o f which overlap with our dataset.31 The 
correlation with the unadjusted revenue measure (=-0.77) is good enough to justify using 
the more imprecise, yet more widely available, measure.
The degree o f  centralization o f the banking system is measured by the proportion 
o f assets controlled by money center banks. It includes all large commercial banks, 
whether private or state-owned, with the exception o f the central bank. It excludes local 
non-profit banks (savings, mortgages, local-government chartered banks). It also 
excludes the State-chartered banks in the case o f the United States on the grounds that 
the recent deregulation o f interstate branching has had a limited effect. A simulation by 
Berger et al. (1995, pp. 114-117) found that the spread o f interstate banking in the wake 
o f deregulation lagged substantially behind what could have been foreseen.32
Legal origins is a dummy variable coded “ 1” for common law countries and “0” 
for others.
State control is a variable difficult to measure. I used an indicator constructed by 
Nicoletti et al. (1999, p. 74) and described as capturing “public ownership” (in turn 
taking into account the “size” and “scope” o f  the public sector, “control o f public 
enterprises by legislative bodies,” and “special voting rights”) and “(state) involvement in
others to changes in the fiscal treatment of capital gains— difficult to root out without multi-year 
averages.
31 For each country, the OECD first provides “sub-central government taxes as % of total tax revenues” 
and then decomposes this figure into eight “types o f tax autonomy.” I used the decomposition to 
reweigh the first and create an adjusted figure of local tax autonomy. Note that the figures do not 




























































































business operation” (in turn including “price controls” and “use o f command and 
control regulations”). The indicator ranges from 0.55 for the United Kingdom to 3.92 for 
Italy.
I include three control variables— GN P per capita to control for cross-sectional 
variations in demand for stocks related to wealth; the relative size o f the population 65 of 
age and above to control for the demand for pension funds; the relative importance of 
state-mandated pension plans to control for the same fact. All the data arc supplied in an 
appendix.
I run several OLS regressions, each reflecting a causal articulation o f the 
argument as sketched in Figure 3. The use o f Ordinary (as opposed to Two-S/age)-Least- 
Squartd is justified by the absence o f any pairwise correlation among regression 
residuals.32 3 Regression results are listed in Table 2. The population is a cross-national 
panel o f 20 O EC D  countries for the year 1991, the largest number and latest year for 
which I have the required data.34 The number o f observations is still too small to satisfy 
the limit theorem condition or to shield the results from the undesirable influence of 
outlying observations; I compensate for these weakness by resorting to the graphic 
representation of bivariate relations as much as possible, and to that o f partial relations to 
spot outliers.
(Table 2]
The first regression shows the close association between centralized state 
institutions and a large money center banking sector. The bivariate relationship (shown in 
Figure 4) points to Switzerland as potential outlier. Switzerland is a country where the
32 The authors concluded that unit-banking legislation was not the only obstacle to interstate banking; 
the federal deposit insurance, equalizing deposit safety across banks of all sizes, is an additional 
obstacle to entry.
33 Breusch-Pagan tests of independence on all specifications show a chi2 close to zero, with a 




























































































large amount of international business handled by the center banks artificially boosts the 
relative importance o f that sector. Note the size o f the coefficient (0.58), which suggests 
that had Germany been as grown as centralized as France (33 point difference) its money 
center banks would have owned 19 percent more banking assets (about 6 percent less 
than their French equivalents). The coefficient reaches 0.80 in the absence o f the Swiss 
observation (results unreported).
[Figure 4]
The second regression registers the positive impact o f state centralization on state 
control, while controlling for legal origins. The bivariate relation between state 
centralization and state control helps visualize the regression (Figure 5). The relationship 
is both positive and heteroscedastic: centralization is a necessary but insufficient 
condition for state control— also required is a legal system other than common law. 
Indeed, all the common law countries— and only them— line up along the x-axis, 
suggesting that common law has a strong negative impact on state control. The 
coefficients o f  the state centralization and common law variables in regression 2 suggest 
that if the German state had grown as centralized as France, it would have enjoyed a level 
o f state control (2.67) equivalent to the French state (2.63). But had German law been o f 
the Common type, state control would have been no higher than in the U.K (0.60 
compared to 0.55).
[Figure 5|
The last three regressions bring together the two opposite effects o f  state 
centralization— the positive effect o f banking centralization and the negative effect o f 
state control— while varying controls. Regression 3 controls for G N P per capita alone, 
regression 4 for GN P per capita and the size o f the senior population, and regression 5 34




























































































for all the above plus the relative size o f the state-mandated pension system. The 
coefficients for the three control variables have the expected signs, but only that o f 
wealth can be said to be significandy different from zero with 95 percent confidence.
The coefficients for the intervening variables (money center banks and state 
control), positive and negative respectively, are significant at the 95 percent confidence 
level across specifications. The presence o f  both the independent and intervening 
variables in regression 3 to 5 allows us to assess the relative importance o f the direct and 
indirect effects o f  the independent variables. First, consider state centralization. 
Significandy different from zero in regressions 1 and 2, it is not any more in regressions 3 
to 5. Such results match our expectations that state centralization operates indirecdy and 
inconsistendy through more than one path; they provide an indirect confirmation o f the 
diamond-shaped, suppressor system. The results point to the incompleteness o f the 
federalist hypothesis, which omits the positive indirect effect. The results do confirm the 
state control hypothesis, but provide a richer and more interesting account by identifying 
the determinants o f state control.
Then, consider the common law dummy. Its coefficient is negative in regression 
2 but not significandy different from zero in regressions 3 to 5. This result tends to 
support the idea that common law operates on stock markets through the mediation o f 
state control (Rajan and Zingales’ hypothesis) rather than direcdy (La Porta et al.’s 
hypothesis).
What is the relative impact o f each exogenous variable? The net indirect effect o f 
state centralization is the addition o f the positive effect (the product o f  the two 
coefficients situated on the upper path) and the negative effect (the product o f the two 
coefficients situated on the lower path). It is equal to -0 .1 8  (=  0.58*0.61 — 2.22*-0.24). 
That o f  common law is 0.32 (=  -1.34*-0.24). T o get a sense o f the practical significance 




























































































have been 0.06 points smaller than it was— an insignificant difference; however, had it 
been a Common Law country, the market would have been 0.32 points larger (0.58), 
about as large as that o f  the United States (0.61). State centralization has no visible 
impact, whereas legal origins does.
I try to detect outliers by plotting the partial relations. I use a cleaned-up version 
o f regression 3 (rid o f the two statistically insignificant independent variables). The three 
plots o f Figure 6 show no major outliers, only five countries for which the model is still 
insufficiently specified (Japan, the UK, and Greece, whose stock values are consistendy 
located above the three regression lines, and Finland and Australia, consistendy below). 
The business cycle may have been responsible for the overvaluation o f the Japanese 
stock market in 1991 and its undervaluation in Australia.
[Figure 6]
A visual analysis o f the plots suggests a few revealing two-by-two comparisons. 
Consider the United States and the UK. The United States— the largest absolute stock 
capitalization in the world— owes its large market, holding banking centralization and 
wealth constant, to its low level o f  state control (top right graph o f Figure 6), in turn a 
reflection o f  both its decentralized polity and common law tradition (it is 
overdetermined, as suggested in Figure 5). But the rather decentralized structure o f US 
banking, which reflects federalism (Figure 4), holding state control and wealth constant, 
has a negative impact on the stock market (United Statesj/-axis value in top left graph o f 
Figure 6 is below the mean). Like the United States, the U K has common law and a low 
level of state control (Figure 5), but unlike the United States, it has a centralized banking 
system, which it owes to its centralized polity (Figure 4). Holding wealth constant, bank 
centralization in Britain is sufficient to hoist British market capitalization more than two 



























































































Consider now Germany and the United States. The two countries share a 
decentralized polity, causing the banking system to be decentralized (Figure 4) and 
keeping state control to a minimum (though slighdy higher in Germany than in the 
United States in light o f the different legal tradition (Figure 5). Holding wealth and state 
control constant, both countries score below average stock market values on account o f 
bank decentralization (top left graph in Figure 6). Last contrast Belgium and the UK. The 
two countries have a centralized banking system, but differ on state control (high in 
Belgium because o f both state centralization and civil law). Although Belgium’s stock 
score is almost as high as the U K ’s on account o f its banking system (top left graph in 
Figure 6), the Belgian stock score on account o f  state control is quite low, holding wealth 
constant (top right graph in Figure 6).
Further Evidence
More evidence is required to show the existence o f an effect than its absence. An 
implication o f the argument is that the impact o f  centralization on corporate markets, 
presendy concealed by a half century o f state intervention in industry, should have been 
visible in the prior liberal era. The 1850-1913 period was characterized by an 
unprecedented development o f corporate security markets along with limited state 
control. Surely, there already was a consequential public sector in Europe by the turn of 
the century, consisting o f railroads, the first private bonds to be massively traded. The 
nationalization o f the railroads did not hinder the markets, however, but freed capital for 
investment in industrial stocks. The nationalizations of the 1930s-1950s, in contrast, gave 
no similar boost to the markets, for they usually occurred in depressed markets, and for 
ailing firms, whose equity had lost most o f  its value.35 If  the argument is correct, then the 




























































































two simplifications: (1) there should be a direct positive relation between state 
centralization and the stock market, and (2) the common law variable should have no 
effect (since its action on the market is mediated by the state control variable).
The variables are the same, though calculated differendy. Stock and bond 
holdings data are taken from Goldsmith’s study o f  national balance sheets for the years 
1910-13. Goldsmith’s tables provide us with the relative percentage o f financial assets 
held in the form o f corporate securities, listed or not.36 The independent variable, state 
centralization, is measured as earlier by the proportion o f government revenues drained 
by the central government. Though calculated for 1880 (it is taken from Verdier 1998), 
state centralization is a variable with a long memory. I calculate and draw the partial 
relationships between stock market size, on the one hand, and state centralization, GNP 
per capita, and common law origins, on the other (Figure 7).
[Figure 7]
Graph 7.a is compatible with the idea that a direct positive relation existed 
between state centralization and stock market size in the early years o f the 20,h century. 
Two groups o f countries are clearly distinguishable: the centralized— Belgium, France, 
and the U.K.— and the decentralized— Switzerland, Italy, Germany, and the United 
States. The first group has high stock levels, the second, with the exception again of 
Switzerland, has low stock levels. Graph 7.b is congruous with the already-noted 
importance o f  wealth. Graph 7.c shows that there is no clear association between 
common law origins and market size. Although all cases behave as expected, a caveat is 
in order. Omitting wealth from the calculations would redraw Graph 7.c according to the 
predictions made by the common law origins literature— with the common law countries 35
35 Railroads were also ailing when nationalized, but since they were essentially financed with bonds, 




























































































because the only two common law countries o f  the sample, Britain and the Unit£dy}tates,
were also the two wealthiest countries in the world at the time. It would take more 
observations to enable us to properly separate the impact o f wealth and common law 
origins.
Conclusion
State centralization has two inconsistent effects on stock market size. On the one 
hand, state centralization facilitates the emergence of dominant money center banks, 
which service the needs o f the financial center, fueling the development o f the capital 
market. State decentralization, in contrast, allows blocking coalitions o f small banks, 
small firms, and local governments, with an interest in keeping finance local, to maintain 
the existing privileges o f  local banks and restrain the concentration o f investment in large 
firms and high-growth sectors. On the other hand, state centralization enables the 
government to extend its control over large firms, tolerate a lower return on capital, 
thereby making the shares o f  these firms unattractive to investors. The government o f a 
decentralized state, in contrast, is unlikely to extend control over large firms in the first 
place.
State control o f  markets is lessened in the presence o f common law. To develop, 
financial markets need a legal system that is flexible enough to adapt property rights to 
financial innovation. Yet, flexibility opens the gate to political discretion. Common law 
solves the dilemma by interposing the judge between the state and the market, insuring 
private actors that the rules o f  the game are modified according to a logic that escapes 36
36 Admittedly, not all stocks and bonds were listed on exchanges, let alone actively traded. But since 
exchanges promoted incorporation and incorporation fed exchanges, the country rank-ordering across 




























































































politics and clientelism. In contrast, the civil law system relegates the judge to a subaltern 
position, leaving property rights to hinge a lot more on who governs. In the worst case, 
the system is corrupt. In the best o f cases, formal rights are rigid, obsolete, and a poor fit 
to market reality. It is impossible to say whether the legal origin variable is the cause of 
market development or merely a symptom o f a broader syndrome with deep roots in 
culture, history, and geography.
The interventionist penchant o f centralized states is new. Until World War I, the 
negative effect was absent; France and Belgium had well-developed stock markets. The 
two wars, along with the credit crunch o f the 1930s, caused a diffusion o f the command 
and control approach across countries, irrespective o f legal origins. It is only in the 
1980s, that the OECD-wide convergence on policies o f  deregulation and privatization 
revealed a divergence between common and civil law countries. It took less than a decade 
for Britain, New Zealand, and Australia to deregulate finance, whereas France, Belgium, 
and Italy are still stumbling through it.
Not any form o f checks and balances is favorable to financial market 
development. The strengthening o f an independent judiciary is compatible with market 
development, but the promotion o f  local, associative democracy is not. Social capital with a 
local scope works against mobile capital. The financing o f industrial districts by well-capitalized 
local banks involved in local industry may be good for the current account o f the balance 
o f payments, but it is not good for the capital account.
Not all federal systems are conducive to market development. Weingast (1995) 
coined the expression o f “market-preserving federalism” to describe a subset o f federal 
regimes in which “local governments have primary regulatory responsibility o f the 
economy” except for the movement o f  goods, services, labor, and capital. Although 
Weingast points to 18,h-century England, 19,h-century United States, and current China as 




























































































empty set. A reason why local governments resist centralization in the first place is to 
maintain some kind o f formal control over labor and capital.37 From the Jackson 
Presidency until the Riegle-Neal Act o f  1994, several statutes formally proscribed money 
center banks in the United States from opening branches in local communides. 
Throughout the last two centuries, other federal countries such as Germany, Austria and 
formally centralized, but de facto decentralized, countries such as Italy, Spain, and 
Scandinavia achieved the same result by granting privileges to local banks. State 
decentralization, historically, has had the effect o f  reducing capital mobility and stunting 
financial market development.
I have treated the degree o f state centralization and the legal tradition as 
independent from each other, and, indeed, there is no correlation between the two. 
Historically, however, the two variables were linked, and so in a confounding way. What 
made English law “common” in the 13,h century, was its applicability to the whole realm, 
in contrast with laws that were particular to duchies and counties. Civil law, in contrast, 
was Roman law rediscovered by Italian scholars, adopted by local monarchs, adapted to 
local mores, and modified to fit emerging trading needs. By the 18th century, civil law had 
become a maze o f geographically disparate rules. It is only with the great codifications o f 
the 19th century that France, Germany, and Italy reached a level o f  legal homogeneity 
comparable to England— five centuries later. Colonization diffused English-born 
common law to federal states in North America and Australasia. Still, common, judge- 
made law initially was the law o f a centralized state, while civil, statutory law was the law 
o f governments aspiring only to a similar degree o f centralization. The historical 
association o f state, market, and law is obviously too complex to be captured by a cross- 
sectional analysis— the present one included.
37 The dire predictions that follow from the economic geography literature would tend to justify local 
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Co m p a r a t iv e  D ata on  B a n k s  a n d  St o c k  Ma r k e t s  in F ra n c e  and
G e r m a n y
France Germany
Banking Sectors 1995 (% assets)
Money Center Banks (for-profit) 56 26
Local (non-profit) 29 65
State (non-profit) 15 9
Total 100 100
Stock M arket Size 1998
Market value/GDP 68 51
Capital raised/GFCF 11.6 5.9
Value of share trading/GDP 182 70
Notes and Sources: GFCF stands for Gross Fixed Capital Formation. The banking 






























































































C R O S S-S K C TIO N A L O L S  ES TIM A TES O F  THE MODEL
Dependent Variable:
Money 
center banks State control Stock Market Capitalization
Independent
Variables: 1 2 3 4 5
0 .58 2 .2 2 0 .3 3 0.21 0 .2 5
State centralization (2 .88 )* ’ (2 .84)* (1 .06) (0 .59) (0 .67)
-1 .34 -0 .0 5 -0.01 -0 .0 0 2
Common law (-4 .40)** (-0 .41) (-0 .05) (-0 .01)
Intervening
Variables:
0.61 0 .6 9 0 .6 3
Money center banks (2 .67)* (2 .69)* (2 .19 )*
-0 .2 4 -0 .2 3 -0 .2 2
State control (-3 .94)** (-3 .70)** (-3 .31 )**
Control Variables:
0 .0 0 0 0 2 2 0 .0 0 0 0 2 0 0 .0 0 0 0 2 0
GNP per capita (2 .90)* (2 .42)* (2 .37 )*
2 .0 8 2 .2 6
Old population (0 .74) (0 .7 7 )
-0.01
State-mandated pension (-0 .52 )
0 .2 6 0 .8 7 -0 .1 7 -0.41 -0 .3 8
Intercept (1 .66) (1 .43) (-0 .74) (-0 .84) (-0 .74 )
Adj. R squared 0 .28 0 .5 9 0 .7 0 0 .6 9 0 .6 8
Correlation between 2 /1 :0 .0 3 3/1: 0 .0 0 4/1 : 0 .0 0 5/1 : 0 .0 0
regression residuals 3/2: 0 .0 0 4/2 : 0 .0 0 5/2 : 0 .0 0
Notes: N=20. Values of /-statistics are given in parentheses. Data are for 1991; they 
are described in the Appendix.





























































































D a t a s e t
Country (1 ) (2 ) (3 ) (4 ) (5 ) (6 ) (7 ) (8 )
Australia 0.71 1 0 .92 0 .50 1.26 1 7 ,2 80 2 .5 5 0.11
Austria 0 .6 8 0 0 .3 6 0 .17 2.11 2 0 ,5 5 0 5 .5 6 0 .15
Belgium 0.91 0 0 .6 9 0 .3 7 2 .7 8 1 9 ,4 60 4 .7 7 0 .1 5
C an ad a 0 .4 8 1 0 .5 8 0 .47 1.29 2 0 ,1 3 0 4 .17 0.11
D enm ark 0 .7 0 0 0 .4 7 0 .3 7 2 .4 6 2 4 ,6 8 0 4 .69 0 .1 6
Finland 0 .7 2 0 0 .6 7 0 .12 2 .6 8 2 3 ,4 9 0 7 .02 0 .1 4
France 0.81 0 0 .5 3 0 .2 9 2 .6 3 2 0 ,5 0 0 6 .95 0 .14
G erm any 0 .4 8 0 0 .2 7 0 .2 6 1.76 2 1 ,4 9 0 6 .98 0 .1 5
G reece 0 .9 5 0 0 .6 2 0 .14 3 .8 7 8 ,2 9 0 5 .88 0 .14
Italy 0.91 0 0 .4 0 0 .1 5 3 .9 5 1 8 ,8 5 0 8 .3 4 0 .1 5
Japan 0 .6 4 0 0 .4 5 0 .93 1.29 2 7 ,2 0 0 2 .90 0 .1 3
N etherlands 0 .8 9 0 0 .5 4 0 .49 2 .2 8 1 8 ,8 7 0 6 .0 2 0 .1 3
N Z 0 .9 2 1 0 .6 6 0 .34 1.66 1 2 ,050 7 .62 0.11
N orw ay 0 .8 3 0 0.41 0.21 3 .1 9 2 6 ,8 0 0 5 .89 0 .1 6
Portugal 0 .9 2 0 0 .7 0 0 .12 2 .8 3 7 ,0 9 0 3 .44 0 .1 4
Spain 0.81 0 0 .5 6 0 .2 6 2 .5 9 1 2 ,5 60 6 .1 3 0 .14
Sw eden 0 .6 2 0 0 .4 2 0 .44 1.51 2 5 ,6 2 0 7 .7 5 0 .18
Sw itzerland 0 .3 8 0 0 .7 0 0 .77 2 .08 3 4 ,0 6 0 5 .40 0 .1 5
UK 0 .9 3 1 0 .8 3 1 .02 0 .5 5 1 6 ,5 20 4.91 0 .1 6
U S 0 .5 6 1 0 .4 6 0.61 0 .8 5 2 2 ,8 0 0 3 .3 3 0 .1 3
M ean 0 .7 4 0 .2 5 0 .6 9 0 .4 0 2 .1 8 19 ,915 0 .14 5 .52
Std. Dev. 0 .1 7 0 .4 4 0 .1 8 0 .26 0 .92 6 ,5 5 6 0 .02 1.67
Data Description and Sources: All data are for 1991. (1) State centralization is the 
ratio of Central Government Receipts/fCentral and Local Government Receipts - 
Transfers from Central to Local Governments). The sums transferred from the central 
to the local governments are subtracted from the denominator to avoid double 
counting. The source is OECD National Accounts 1995. In the case of New Zealand, 
the ratio was redefined as (Central Government Receipts - Social Security 
Contributions)/(General Government Receipts - Social Security Contributions), with 
General Government including all forms of government. The source for New Zealand 
is: United Nations 1995.
(2) Common Law is a dummy variable, coded “ 1” for countries of common law 
origins, “0” otherwise.
(3) Money center banks measures the total-asset market share of for-profit banks, 
including nationalized banks with a corporate status. Besides money center banks, the 
population of reference also includes state banks (postal savings, special credit 
agencies), local non-profit banks (savings, cooperative, building societies, local- 




























































































institutional investors (insurance companies and investment funds) are excluded. For 
a justification of the categorization, see Author 2000. Sources are too numerous to be 
listed here; they can be obtained from the author.
(4) Stock Market Capitalization was calculated by FIBV 1992. It is described as “ the 
total number of issued shares of domestic companies, including their several classes, 
multiplied by their respective prices.” The figure excludes investment funds and 
“companies whose only business goal is to hold shares of other listed companies.” 
The figures are expressed in percent of GDP. For Greece and Portugal, I used data 
from Global Financial Data.
(5) State control is a ranking of 21 countries constructed by Nicoletti et al. (1999, p. 
74) and described as capturing “public ownership” (in turn taking into account the 
“size” and “scope” of the public sector, “control of public enterprises by legislative 
bodies,” and “special voting rights” ) and “(state) involvement in business operation” 
(in turn including “price controls” and “use of command and control regulations”).
(6) GNP per capita in current US$: source is World Bank.
(7) State public pension in percent of GDP comprises all cash expenditures on old-age 
pensions within the public sphere; it is category 1.1 of the OECD Social Expenditure 
Database 1980-1996.






























































































Impact  o f  St a t e  C e n t r a l i z a t i o n  on  St o c k  M a r k e t
State centralization
Money Center \







































































































Note: The arrows roughly indicate the flow of funds:
1. corporations repay bank loans by issuing equity on the primary capital market;
2. banks channel individuals’ savings and firms’ current accounts to the money 
market;
3. the money market leverages the secondary capital market;
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